The election campaign is entering its final stretch, and the emerging picture centers on Netanyahu's strategic weakness, the great difficulty in building a broad coalition, regardless of the size of the Likud. In the current mandate map, the political decision is not derived from the identity of the largest party, but from the existence of a practical path to forming a government.
Netanyahu actually has one path: Likud, the Haredim, Ben Gvir and Smotrich must together reach a majority of 61. If this bloc remains below the threshold, the real problem begins. The political center and left are largely built around replacing him, while the possibility of leaning on an Arab party is almost nonexistent in his bloc's current political composition.
This is perhaps Netanyahu's great paradox. The partners who ensure the loyalty of his bloc are also the ones who limit his ability to expand it. Ben-Gvir and Smotrich set a clear political boundary with the Arab parties, and Smotrich has already proven in the past how decisive his opposition to relying on Ra'am can be. Therefore, if Netanyahu is four or five seats short, the question is not just how many he is short, but where exactly he is supposed to get them from.
This is not a tactical weakness of a particular campaign, but a structural limitation. The more the bloc identifies with the positions of the hard right, the fewer parties that can join it after the elections. Any attempt to be flexible is likely to provoke resistance from existing partners, while any new partner may demand a political price that will undermine the internal balance.
On the other side is an almost opposite picture. The Change Bloc is less homogeneous, consisting of parties with different and sometimes even opposing views, but this division gives it a greater scope for connections. It does not necessarily need a perfect ideological coalition, it needs a sufficiently broad political consensus, around a common goal, the establishment of a government not headed by Netanyahu.
This is where Mansour Abbas comes into the picture. Abbas has already proven that for him, politics is also a tool for obtaining budgets, influence, and change for Arab society. If after the elections it becomes clear that the votes of the Ra'am party can decide between a government and another round of elections, it is difficult to assume that he will give up his power in advance. Support does not even have to be expressed in a full coalition meeting; outside support, abstention, or a specific political arrangement may also become a possibility.
The parties of Yoaz Hendel and Ofer Winter, which are hovering around the threshold, may also be much more significant than we currently see. These parties were created out of a leadership vacuum and the current government's lack of economic and security solutions on the issue of conscription and other issues, and if one of them passes and enters the Knesset with four seats, it will find itself holding the coalition key the morning after the elections. In such a situation, the question will no longer be what was said during the campaign, but what can be achieved in the created reality. These players cannot be flexible on the issue of conscription and equality of burden without losing their public. On the other hand, Shas and the haredi parties hold a rigid veto on the issue. In this dead end with the Netanyahu bloc, four seats in the right place can be worth much more than four seats, and they will find themselves inevitably drawn to the Change Bloc in order to translate their power into practical and practical influence.
Victory in Israeli elections is ultimately measured by the ability to bring 61 fingers or at least create a parliamentary majority that allows the formation of a government. Therefore, the real battle is not for the first, fifteenth, or thirtieth mandate. It is for the last four or five mandates and mainly the question of who is able to achieve them. Here lies the structural advantage of the Change Bloc, not necessarily a broader or more stable base, but a greater number of political options after the elections.
Netanyahu has already proven many times that he should not be eulogized politically too soon, and this time too, it is right to leave room for surprise, for last-minute mandate transfers and changes in voter turnout. But if the current picture of the blocs is maintained at the ballot box, these elections may be remembered not as the moment when Netanyahu lost another election, but as the moment when the political structure that allowed him to return to power time and time again stopped working.
In this sense, it is not the number of Likud mandates that heralds the end of the era. It is the fact that the system around it is having difficulty creating the connections needed to form a government. If there is no other way to reach 61, we may no longer be asking whether the Netanyahu era is over? But rather who will succeed in building the era that follows him?
Hahahahaha. You are living in a movie where the Netanyahu era is over. He will show you the delusional ones where the fish pee!!!
Netanyahu, a wise and intelligent man, knows that he is indeed leaving office on Tuesday.
The fact that you are a slave and worship a wicked person who doesn't count on you is your problem.