While the headlines are about missiles, strikes, and mutual threats, the real decision-making is taking place around the negotiating table. Even after the exchange of blows between the United States and Iran, the direction in which the parties are moving seems clear: an understanding that will allow both sides to get off the ground without degenerating into a wide-ranging regional war.
The past few months have once again illustrated a fundamental truth in the relationship between Israel and the United States: Israel is a strong and militarily powerful country, but when it comes to shaping the strategic reality in the Middle East, the United States remains the most influential factor.
The old saying "the owner of the century - the owner of the opinion" is not always pleasant to the ear, but in many cases it reflects reality. The American pressure that led to the ceasefire between Israel and Iran illustrates that even when Israel exerts significant force, Washington continues to influence the boundaries of the campaign and its end point.
Iran – Understanding or Postponement of the Crisis?
Despite the recent exchange of blows, it appears that Washington and Tehran are moving toward a memorandum of understanding or an interim agreement.
The emerging understandings reportedly include a 60-day ceasefire, reopening the Strait of Hormuz, releasing some of Iran's frozen funds, and expanding Iranian oil exports. At the same time, the core issues of enriched uranium, inspection mechanisms, the scope of future enrichment, and the nuclear program will be discussed during the interim period.
Even after the mutual attacks in the Gulf, both sides avoided a full-scale escalation. Iran's announcement that it had completed its response and the limited American response indicate that both sides are still interested in continuing on the diplomatic track.
The reason for this is clear. Trump wants to prevent a regional war, maintain energy price stability, avoid economic shocks, and achieve a significant diplomatic achievement. Iran, for its part, needs economic relief and a release of some of the pressure that has built up on it.
This is precisely where the gap between Washington and Jerusalem comes into play.
For the United States, the success of the agreement will be measured by its ability to prevent war. For Israel, its success will be measured by its ability to prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear-armed state in the future.
If the issue of enriched uranium remains open, if Iran is allowed to continue enrichment at a certain level, and if the issues of ballistic missiles and regional extensions are postponed to the future, the agreement may not resolve the crisis but only postpone it.
Comparisons to the 2015 nuclear deal are inevitable. However, the real question is not whether this is a better or worse agreement, but whether at the end of the sixty days Iran will be further away from a nuclear weapon or will it be given time, money, and room to maneuver that will allow it to recover and prepare for the next conflict.
The arenas are connecting.
One of the main lessons of recent months is that it is increasingly difficult to separate the various arenas in the Middle East.
For years, Israel tried to deal with each front separately: Iran, Lebanon, Gaza, and Yemen. However, Iran built a regional concept that connects all the arenas.
Hence the Israeli difficulty in demanding a complete separation between the Lebanese arena and the Iranian arena. From the perspective of the United States and the Gulf states, regional stability is a single package.
Lebanon – the first test of the agreement
If the ceasefire in Lebanon is indeed included in the broader understandings, then the central question is no longer how to stop the fighting, but who will control southern Lebanon the day after.
President Joseph Aoun and other Lebanese officials are working to strengthen state institutions and the Lebanese army. Talks expected towards the end of June may address a new model of state control in southern Lebanon, including areas such as Nabatieh and its surroundings.
Israel needs to recognize the window of opportunity that has emerged. Instead of settling for military action, it should explore, together with the United States, France, and other countries, an initiative that would allow the Lebanese army to gradually deploy in the south of the country, alongside effective international oversight mechanisms.
At the same time, and in accordance with meeting clear goals, it will be possible to discuss a gradual Israeli withdrawal.
However, there is a real concern that the ceasefire will be maintained but Hezbollah will remain a significant military force. If Israel is forced to withdraw from southern Lebanon without the situation on the ground changing, many will question whether the goals of the war have been achieved.
Ultimately, the question in Lebanon is not whether there will be a ceasefire, but who will control southern Lebanon after it.
Gaza and Judea and Samaria
New thinking is also emerging in the Gaza Strip. The mediators are promoting a model of gradual disarmament of Hamas and the transfer of civilian responsibility to a technocratic Palestinian body. Here too, the American goal is to strengthen government institutions at the expense of armed organizations.
At the same time, the American administration is expected to try to prevent escalation in Judea and Samaria out of a desire to maintain overall regional stability. Settlement measures, recognition of farms, and friction on the ground could become another point of contention between Jerusalem and Washington.
Alongside this, the issue of protecting minorities in the Middle East: Christians, Druze, Kurds, and other groups, is expected to gain increasing weight in American discourse, especially in light of developments in Syria.
The elections and Druze society
The Memorandum of Understanding between the United States and Iran, if indeed signed, may also affect the Israeli election campaign.
The question of whether Israel was complicit in its design or was merely informed about it may become part of the public debate.
There is a growing demand in Druze society to translate the long-standing partnership with the state into tangible achievements in the areas of planning, housing, education, employment, and the fight against crime. These issues are expected to be integrated into the upcoming election campaign.
And what happens if the negotiations fail??
Even if the Memorandum of Understanding is signed, the most important question will be what happens after it.
Over the next sixty days, the United States and Iran will have to deal with the truly difficult issues: enriched uranium, the scope of future enrichment, inspection mechanisms, ballistic missiles, and regional proxies.
If understandings are reached, we may see the beginning of a new regional order.
But if the talks fail, Trump will face three options: extending the negotiations, returning to maximum economic pressure, or returning to the military option.
From the perspective of Israel, which will likely be in the midst of an election campaign, the question will once again arise as to whether it is possible to accept a situation in which the nuclear, missile, and proxy issues remain unresolved.
Summary – New Regional Order or Temporary Respite?
Perhaps for the first time in years, Washington is trying to promote a broad regional move that includes stability in the Gulf, strengthening the Lebanese state, the gradual dismantling of armed organizations, and preventing escalation in various arenas.
But from an Israeli perspective, weighty questions remain:
Is Iran now receiving the bulk of the payoff while the essential concessions are postponed to the next stage?
Will Hezbollah continue to be the dominant military force in Lebanon?
Will the nuclear issue really be resolved or will it just be postponed?
And will Israel be able to explain to the public that the war goals have been achieved if the main threats still exist?
It is possible that the emerging understanding agreement will prevent war in 2026.
The big question is whether he will also prevent the war of 2027 or 2028.
The real debate is not about the 2026 agreement, but about the Middle East of 2028.
Perhaps the most important question is not whether Israel was informed about the agreement, but whether Washington believes it needs its consent.
And meanwhile, in the Middle East the old rule still holds true: The owner of the century – the owner of the opinion.